OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR SECOND GUESSERS

BY

J. MICHAEL STEELE and JIM ZIDEK

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1. INTRODUCTION

The goal in many activities or contests is not necessarily to do well in any absolute sense, but merely to cut perform an adversary. The objective of this paper is to provide a model for such a contest, establish the optimality of certain procedures, and provide suitable approximations to these optimal procedures. But before yielding to the Mathematics of the model, we wish to fix ideas with an anecdote.

Two statisticians, Bob and Mike, engage in a contest to guess weights of people at a party. They agree that Bob will always guess first. Mike will then guess and finally the person in question will say who is closer. For example on person number one Bob guessed 137 pounds. Mike then guessed 137.01 pounds and the guest declared Mike the victor. The contest continued in a similar vein and to Bob's dismay he won barely a quarter of the time.

Intuitively it is clear that the second guesser has an advantage, and one of the results of Section 2 shows that this advantage is typically as large as the 75 percent obtained by Mike in the anecdote.

To continue the story, Bob was so stunned by defeat and eager for revenge, that he elicited the assistance of a professional weight guesser. Mike agreed that since the new team was so powerful it should be willing to make all of its guesses about the weights of the guests before Mike had to state any of his guesses. The team agreed to the proposed rule change, and Mike then proceeded to win even more convincingly than before.
The strategy used by Mike in the second case is naturally more sophisticated than the one he used when he was matched against an equal. This second strategy derives from an hierarchical linear model like that studied in Lindley and Smith [8]. It is also closely connected with the James-Stein estimator and was originally motivated by the "Batting Average" example of Efron and Morris [3].

Our program begins by establishing in Section 2 a formal theory of guessing contests. We also give a simple but very general optimality result which forms the basis for the rest of the paper.

The third section determines the exact optimal strategy for second guessing under a certain linear model. Practical approximations to this optimal strategy are worked out in Section 4. The final section gives a critical discussion of the various sources of difficulties inherent in applying this theory of guessing contests. While the main point of this paper is to provide a tractible theory of guessing contests, we feel that the largest single point established is the approximate optimality of the simple rule given by Equation (4.1).
2. HOTELLING'S STRATEGY

The structure of our guessing model can be described by a system of four $p$ vectors.

Target Values: $(\theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots, \theta_p) = \theta$

First Guess: $(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_p) = X$

Second Guesser's Hunch: $(Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_p) = Y$

Second Guess: $(G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_p) = G$

The $\theta_i$ represent the real values to be guessed. The $X_i$ are guesses made by the person who goes first and all of these are assumed to be available to the second guesser before he acts. The $Y_i$ represent the second guesser's best estimate of the $\theta_i$. Finally, the $G_i$ are the guesses to be announced by the second guesser.

Our principal task is to determine how $G$ should be based on $X$ and $Y$.

The objective of each player is to come closer to $\theta$ than his opponent, so we begin by setting

\begin{equation}
V(G, \theta) = \sum_{j=1}^{p} V_j(G, \theta)
\end{equation}

where

\[ V_j(G, \theta) = \begin{cases} 
1 & |G_j - \theta_j| \leq |X_j - \theta_j| \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \]
The strategic objective of the second guesser is therefore to maximize 
\( E V(G, \theta) \), i.e., the second guesser wishes to maximize the expected 
number of times his guesses come closer to the true values.

The only probabilistic assumptions to be made now are that \( \theta, X, Y \) 
have a joint distribution which is continuous. This assumption is made 
for convenience and avoids the ad hoc conventions required for dealing 
with ties.

Now let \( v_i(X, Y) \) denote the median of the conditional distribution 
of \( \theta_i \) given \( X \) and \( Y \). A key role in our guessing theory is played 
by the following strategy:

\[
G^\epsilon_i = \begin{cases} 
  X_i + \epsilon & \text{if } X_i < v_i(X, Y) \\
  X_i - \epsilon & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

These strategies will subsequently be called Hotelling Strategies 
since they were essentially put forward in Hotelling [6, p. 51]. There 
are broad differences between the present model and Hotelling's problem 
in location economics, but the relationship seems close enough to 
justify (or even require) the name. The main fact in this section is 
the following simple result:

**Theorem 2.1.** The Hotelling Strategies are \( \epsilon \)-optimal, that is,

\[
\lim_{\epsilon \to 0} E V(G^\epsilon, \theta) = \sup_{G} E V(G, \theta).
\]

**Proof.** Since any guess \( G_i \) must be on one side or the other of \( X_i \) 
we have
\[ P^X,Y(\left| G_i - \theta_i \right| < |X_i - \theta_i|) \leq \max\{P^X,Y(\theta_i < X_i), P^X,Y(\theta_i \geq X_i)\} \]

The basic observation about \( G_i^c \) is that

\[ \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} P^X,Y(\left| G_i^c - \theta_i \right| < |X_i - \theta_i|) = \max\{P^X,Y(\theta_i \leq X_i), P^X,Y(\theta_i \geq X_i)\} \]

Taking expectations in the two preceding relations and summing over \( 1 \leq i \leq p \), the theorem is proved.

A compelling impediment to the use of Hotelling strategies is that they require the knowledge of the joint distribution of \( \theta, X, Y \), or at least the knowledge of \( \nu_i(X,Y) \). The key task of the remainder of this paper is to isolate some feasible circumstances where this impediment can be overcome.

To begin, consider the strategies

\[ \tilde{G}_i = \begin{cases} X_i + \varepsilon & \text{if } X_i < Y_i \\ X_i - \varepsilon & \text{if } X_i > Y_i \end{cases} \]

where the second guesser places his guess just a bit to the side of the first guess in the direction of his own "hunch" \( Y_i \).

In some cases one can show that these Hunch Guided Guesses are in fact Hotelling strategies. Certainly, if the vectors \( (\theta_1, Y_1, X_1) \), \( 1 \leq i \leq p \) are independent and \( \theta_i | Y_i \sim N(Y_i, \sigma^2_Y) \), \( X_i | \theta_i, Y_i = X_1 | \theta_i \sim N(\theta_i, \sigma^2_X) \) then \( \nu_i(X,Y) \) is on the same side of \( X_i \) as \( Y_i \). This immediately implies that the Hotelling and Hunch Guided strategies will then coincide.

Without distributional assumptions on \( \theta \) one can no longer speak of the optimality of a guessing strategy, but the following result points out a case where the second guesser can still realize a substantial advantage.
Three Quarters Theorem. If \( \bar{X} = X - \theta \) and \( \bar{Y} = Y - \theta \) are identically distributed, independent and symmetric about zero, then the Hunch Guided Guess has probability \( \frac{3}{4} \) of winning as \( \epsilon \to 0 \).

Proof. As \( \epsilon \to 0 \) the probability that the Hunch guided guesser loses is \( P(\bar{Y} < \bar{X} < 0) + P(0 < \bar{X} < \bar{Y}) \). By symmetry and exchangeability this probability also equals

\[
2P(0 < \bar{Y} < \bar{X}) = P(0 < \bar{X} \text{ and } 0 < \bar{Y}) = \frac{1}{4}.
\]

In a practical application of the three-quarter theorem the assumption of identical distributions might seem to pose some difficulties. Reassuringly, the result is quite robust. For example, assuming unbiased jointly normal guesses the second guesser still wins with probability greater than .68 when \( \text{Var} \bar{Y} / \text{Var} \bar{X} = 2.5 \) and wins with probability greater than .59 when \( \text{Var} \bar{Y} / \text{Var} \bar{X} = 10 \). (These probabilities are easily confirmed by tables of the bivariate normal (e.g. Owen [10]).) The more detailed assessment of robustness in guessing competitions will be dealt with in a subsequent report, but one should note an obvious aspect of non-robustness under gross changes in the model of Theorem 2.1 is that the probability of the second guesser winning will tend to \( \frac{1}{2} \) or 1 according as \( \text{Var} \bar{Y} / \text{Var} \bar{X} \) tends to \( \infty \) or 0.

1. A result equivalent to the above was told to the first author in 1975 by R. Chacon and was known much earlier to R. Chacon and S. Kochen. The result was also known earlier to T. Cover in the form: Between two "equally matched" basketball teams the odds are 3 to 1 in favor of the team leading at the half.
3. GAUSSIAN GUESSING

Since Hotelling strategies have been shown to be optimal, one would naturally like to provide a class of models in which the strategies can be determined explicitly. The main result of this section is to give such explicit strategies under a multivariate normal model studied by Lindley [8] and Lindley and Smith [9].

We write $U|V$ for the conditional distribution of $U$ given $V$, $1_p$ for the row $p$-vector $(1,1,...,1)$, and $I_p$ for the $p\times p$ identity matrix.

Our Gaussian Model assumptions are the following:

$$\theta|\mu \sim N(\mu 1_p, \sigma^2 I_p)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.1)

$$\mu \sim N(\mu_0, \sigma^2)$$

and

$$X,Y|\theta,\mu \sim N(\theta 1_p, I_p)\Gamma$$

where

$$\Gamma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma^2 I_p & 0 \\ X^T I_p & \sigma^2 I_p \end{pmatrix}.$$  

The physical motives behind this model are that the true weights $\theta$ of the persons we see are viewed as independent realizations of a single fixed random process which was itself once drawn from a population of random processes. For example, the parameter $\mu$ can be viewed as a geographically fixed quantity determined at a earlier time by (random) immigrations. The assumption of normality one made partially out of traditional convenience, but also because they seem justifiable in the weight guessing example. The structural model together with
the normality lead uniquely to the Gaussian Model specified in (3.1.) The promised explicit determination of the Hotelling strategy is now possible.

**Theorem 3.1.** Under the preceding Gaussian Model the Hotelling strategy is

\[
G_i^* = \begin{cases} 
X_1 + \epsilon & \text{if } X_1 < \gamma \mu_0 + (1-\gamma)[\beta \bar{X} + (1-\beta)\bar{Y}] \\
X_1 - \epsilon & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

(3.2)

where

\[
\gamma = \sigma^{-2} \left( \sigma^{-2} + \sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2} \right)^{-1}, \quad \sigma^2 = \sigma_\theta^2 + \rho \sigma_\mu^2
\]

\[
\alpha = \sigma_\theta^{-2} \left( \sigma_\theta^{-2} + \sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2} \right)^{-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = \sigma_X^{-2} \left( \sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2} \right)^{-1}.
\]

The proof of the preceding depends on a multivariate calculation which we have deferred to Appendix I in order to take up directly the problem of interpreting the result.

The basic part is the mixture of means, \(\gamma \mu_0 + (1-\gamma)[\beta \bar{X} + (1-\beta)\bar{Y}]\), which is perturbed on trial \(i\) by the "mixture" of residuals \(\alpha \cdot 0 + (1-\alpha)[\beta (X_i - \bar{X}) + (1-\beta)(Y_i - \bar{Y})]\). The coefficient \(\beta = \sigma_X^{-2} (\sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2})^{-1}\) appearing in these mixtures is near 0, 1/2, or 1 accordingly as \(\sigma_X^{-2} / \sigma_Y^{-2}\) is near \(\infty\), 1, or 0. This ratio is one natural measure of the relative abilities of the two guessers and this interpretation is reinforced by considering the extreme cases. When \(\sigma_X^{-2} / \sigma_Y^{-2} \sim \infty\) the first guess is essentially ignored and when \(\sigma_X^{-2} / \sigma_Y^{-2} \sim 0\) it is the bunch which gets ignored. This last case is of particular interest since it corresponds to trying to out guess a far better informed adversary.
4. STEIN GUIDED GUESSING

The strategies just derived have the drawback that they are functions of $\mu_0$, $\sigma_\mu^2$, $\sigma_\theta^2$, $\sigma_X^2$, and $\sigma_Y^2$. Although the magnitude of $\mu_0$ and of the relevant variance ratios may be sufficiently understood for some applications, the exact values of these quantities can not generally be assumed to be known. The next objective is thus to derive reasonable estimates to the unknown mean and variances. One benefit of this analysis is a clearer understanding of the empirical fact [3] that the Stein estimator performs well with respect to the reward function $V$.

A Bayesian approach to the above estimations can be made along the lines suggested in Lindley and Smith [9] but such a procedure can prove quite complex (c.f. Discussion [9] by V. D. Barnett). The estimators considered here are based on an empirical Bayes procedure which seems both simple and sensible.

As before we write $Z = (X, Y)$ and begin by transforming $Z$ into a canonical form. Next we recall that $1_p^T P^T P = pP^T \Delta P$ where $P$ denotes the $p \times p$ Helmert orthogonal matrix (c.f. [2], p. 102) and $\Delta$ is the $p \times p$ matrix with $1$ in the $(1,1)$ position and all other entries zero. We define $(U, V)$ by

$$(U, V) = 2^{-1/2} (X, Y) \begin{pmatrix} I_p & I_p \\ I_p & -I_p \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} P^T & 0 \\ 0 & P^T \end{pmatrix}$$
A straightforward calculation shows \( (U, V) \sim N(\mu^*, \Sigma^*) \) where

\[
\mu^* = (2p)^{1/2} \mu_0(e, 0),
\]

\[
e = (1, 0, \ldots, 0),
\]

\[
\Sigma^* = \begin{bmatrix}
\sigma^2_{I_p} & \sigma^2_{-I_p} \\
\sigma^2_{-I_p} & \sigma^2_{I_p}
\end{bmatrix} + \frac{2\sigma_0^2}{p} \begin{bmatrix} I_p & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} + 2\rho_{12} \frac{\sigma_0^2}{p} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix},
\]

and

\[
\sigma^2_+ = \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_X^2 + \sigma_Y^2), \quad \sigma^2_- = \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_X^2 - \sigma_Y^2).
\]

From the canonical form above one notes that \( \sigma^2_\mu \) cannot be meaningfully estimated since there is only one degree of freedom available for its estimation.

We now turn to the analysis of important special cases which correspond to qualitatively different contexts.

**Case A. Known Variances.** We only need to estimate \( \mu_0 \) and this is done by maximizing the Type II likelihood (c.f. Good [5]). This calculation easily follows from equation (A.1) of the appendix, and the estimator obtained is

\[
\hat{\mu}_0 = (1_{2p} \Sigma^{-1} Z^T)(1_{2p} \Sigma^{-1} Z \Sigma^{-1})^{-1}.
\]

This simplifies further to just
\[ \hat{\mu}_0 = \beta \overline{X} + (1-\beta) \overline{Y}, \]

so the estimated Hotelling strategy becomes

\[ G_i^* = \begin{cases} 
  x_i + \epsilon & \text{if } x_i < \alpha [\beta \overline{X} + (1-\beta) \overline{Y}] + (1-\alpha) [\beta x_i + (1-\beta) y_i] \\
  x_i - \epsilon & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases}, \]

where the parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are as specified in Theorem 3.1.

Case B. \( \sigma^2_\mu = 0; \sigma^2_\xi = \sigma^2_\gamma = \xi^2 \) and \( \sigma^2_\theta \) unknown. The canonical model simplifies to

\[ (u, v) \sim N \left( (2p)^{1/2} \mu_0 (e, 0), \xi^2 \left( \begin{array}{cc} I_p & 0 \\ 0 & I_p \end{array} \right) + 2\sigma^2_\theta \left( \begin{array}{cc} I_p & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{array} \right) \right), \]

and this time estimators are easily found without carrying out the likelihood maximization. We take the estimators of \( \theta_\mu, \tau = (\xi^2 + 2\sigma^2_\theta)^{-1} \) and \( \xi^2 \), respectively, given by

\[ \hat{\mu}_0 = (2p)^{-1/2} u_1 \]

\[ \hat{\tau} = p \left( \sum_{i=1}^{p} u_i^2 \right)^{-1} \]

and

\[ \hat{\xi}^2 = p^{-1} v v^T. \]

In terms of \( X \) and \( Y \) we then get
\[ \hat{\mu}_0 = \frac{1}{2} (\bar{X} + \bar{Y}) \]

\[ \hat{\tau} = p \left( \sum_{i=1}^{p} \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (X_i + Y_i) - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\bar{X} + \bar{Y}) \right]^2 \right)^{-1} \]

and

\[ \hat{\sigma}^2 = (p)^{-1} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{p} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (X_i - Y_i)^2 \right). \]

The approximate Hotelling strategy for this case is therefore

\[ c_{i}^* = \begin{cases} 
X_i + \epsilon & \text{if } X_i < \hat{\alpha} \cdot \frac{1}{2} (\bar{X} + \bar{Y}) + (1 - \hat{\alpha}) \cdot \frac{1}{2} (X_i + Y_i) \\
X_i - \epsilon & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \]

where

\[ \hat{\alpha} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{p} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (X_i - Y_i)^2 \right] \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{p} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (X_i + Y_i)^2 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\bar{X} + \bar{Y})^2 \right]^{-1} . \]

One should note that \( \hat{\alpha} \) has a natural interpretation. It is just the ratio (between the guesser variance) \( \frac{1}{\hat{\alpha}} \) (between the trial variance).

The optimal strategy favors using \( \frac{1}{2}(\bar{X} + \bar{Y}) \) when \( \hat{\alpha} \) is close to \( 1 \) and favors \( \frac{1}{2}(X_i + Y_i) \) when \( \hat{\alpha} \) is close to \( 0 \). Also, the strategy can be improved slightly by replacing \( \alpha \) by \( 1 \) if it happens that \( \hat{\alpha} > 1 \).

Case C. \( \sigma^2_{\mu} = 0, \sigma^2_{Y} = \infty, \sigma^2_{X} \text{ Known}; \sigma^2_{\theta} \text{ Unknown}. \)

This is a case we feel to be of particular interest. Calculating as before we find that a Stein estimator determines the approximate Hotelling strategy, but that it plays a cameo role since the strategy
simplifies to just "betting on the $X_i$ side of $\bar{X}$." This simple result gives some theoretical justification to the otherwise somewhat mysterious empirical fact that $\bar{X}$ performs even better than the Stein estimator in terms of "gambler's" loss on the batting average data set (c.f. Plackett's Comment [3, p. 416] and an easy computation).

The formal analysis begins as in Case B. Since $\sigma^2_X = 0$ the $Y$ is uninformative and the analysis must rest on $X$ above. Also since $\sigma^2_\mu = 0$ the canonical form of the $X$'s marginal model can be simplified to

$$u^* \sim N(p^{1/2} \mu_0 e, (\sigma^2_X + \sigma^2_{\theta})I_p).$$

The obvious estimate of $\mu_0$ is given by

$$\hat{\mu}_0 = \bar{X}$$

and if we require that the estimate, $\hat{\tau}_X$, of $\tau_X = (\sigma^2_X + \sigma^2_{\theta})^{-1}$ to be unbiased,

$$\hat{\tau}_X = (p-3)(\sum_{i=1}^p (X_i - \bar{X})^2)^{-1},$$

becomes the natural choice and the estimated Hotelling strategy is

$$G_i^* = \begin{cases} 
X_i + \epsilon & \text{if } X_i < \hat{\alpha}^{*} \bar{X} + (1-\hat{\alpha}^{*})X_i \\
X_i - \epsilon & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

where $\hat{\alpha}^{*} = \min(1, \hat{\alpha})$ and $\hat{\alpha} = \sigma^2_X (p-3)(\sum_{i=1}^p (X_i - \bar{X})^2)^{-1}$. 

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The direction of the guess on the side of $X_1$ is determined by
$\frac{\hat{\alpha}x + (1-\hat{\alpha})x_i}{\overline{x}}$, which is precisely the Stein estimator as modified by Lindley (c.f. [7] and the discussion following [9]).

Now since the convex combination of $\overline{x}$ and $X_1$ will always be on the same side of $X_1$ as $\overline{x}$ the estimated Hotelling strategy can be more simply written as just

\begin{align*}
G_i^* &= \begin{cases} 
X_i + \varepsilon & \text{if } X_i < \overline{x} \\
X_i - \varepsilon & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}.
\end{align*}

(4.1)

This is an extraordinarily simple procedure in a model which we feel may be realistic in several sporting and business contexts.

To assess the performance of this Stein-guided strategy guessing trials were simulated for a variety of special cases. The $\theta_i$ were chosen as $\theta_i = 0$, $\theta_i = i$, and $\theta_i = \frac{i^2}{n}$ for each of $i = 1, 2, \ldots, p$ with $p = 10$ and then with $p = 100$; thus, in all $3 \times 2 = 6$ cases were considered.

As an illustration of the computation consider the case where $\theta_i = i$ and $p = 100$. In this case 200 repetitions were made as follows:

(1) $X$ was generated as $N(\theta, I)$ with $\theta = (1, 2, \ldots, 100)$.
(2) $G_i^*$ was calculated by (4.1) with $\varepsilon = 10^{-6}$.
(3) $V$ was then calculated, and the process was repeated 200 times.
(4) The 200 realizations of $V/100$ were used to estimate the density of $V/100$, the percentage of times the second player wins using the $G_i^*$ of (4.1).
(5) This density was plotted in Figure 2 (in this case, the unshaded density in the middle graph).

From Figure A one learns by looking at the unshaded density in the top graph that when as many as 10 parameters growing like $1^3$ are to be guessed that the modal percent of correct guesses made by the second guesser is about 95 percent. The general conclusion to be drawn from Figure A are (1) the more parameters to be guessed, the greater the advantage to the second guesser and (2) the more spread out the $\theta_1$ to be guessed, the more the advantage to the second guesser.

In Figure B, these conclusions are further examined by taking the $\theta_1$ themselves to be random. Here $p = 20$ was fixed throughout. First we took a realization of $\theta \sim N(0, 4I_{20})$. Then 200 of the $X$'s were generated with the same fixed underlying $\theta$ (just as in Figure A). The density of $V/200$ was estimated as before, and altogether 25 runs were made. The 25 runs produced remarkably similar estimates of the density of $V/200$, and the estimates from runs number 1, 17, and 21 were selected as indicative of the variability in the 25 runs.
A. Estimated Density of the Proportion of Second Gueser Wins Using the Stein-Guided Optimal Strategy (Based on Runs of 200 Contests).
B. Estimated Density of the Proportion of Second Guesser Wins in p = 20 Trials Using the Stein-Guided Optimal Strategy (3 Runs of 100 Contests and Combined Runs of 2500 Contests).
5. REALITIES OF APPLICATION

Almost any discussion of the preceding theory eventually turns to
the problem of football betting, and it seems generally worthwhile to
note why the theory is not applicable to that problem. A key reason
is that the bookie (or person "setting the line") is not trying to
estimate the actual point spread. He is trying to produce a point
spread which will produce a nearly equal number of takers on each side
of the spread. The bookie is therefore not a "first guesser" in the
sense of this paper and our theory naturally does not apply.

Consider instead two bookies of equal caliber, one of whom sets
his line on Monday and the other on Tuesday (for the game on Sunday).
If the Tuesday bookie only wished to obtain a more even distribution
of customers on either side of his line than the Monday bookie, he
should be able to do so in almost $3/4$ of the games by using the Hunch
guided guessing of Section 2. In this case, each bookie is a bona fide
guesser of that spread which will evenly split the pool of betters.

Since there are actually many games each week, the Tuesday bookie
could actually out perform the Monday bookie by using the Stein guided
strategy of Section 4, particularly (4.1). The assumptions of (3.1) may
not be applicable to the whole set of games; but if one considers only
non-carismatic games outside the bookie's city, then (3.1) seems
reasonable. (This is a stratification step to obtain increased homogeneity
of the spreads to be guessed.)

The examples put forward above are in the long tradition of gedanken
experimente, and the problem of producing a truly telling application remains
open. An intriguing aspect of a theory of this nature is that it is only
necessary to find one good application.

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Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 3.1

By Theorem 2.1 the problem depends on the calculation of the posterior median \( \nu_1(X,Y) \) which by the normality assumptions (3.1) coincides with the posterior mean. The argument given here for completeness is similar to those of Lindley [7] and Lindley and Smith [9]. It depends on the well known fact (c.f. [1], p. 27) that if \( U \) and \( V \) are jointly normal then

\[ U | V \sim N(EU - EV \cdot \zeta + V\xi, \Sigma_{U/V}) \]

where \( \zeta = \Sigma_{VV}^{-1} \Sigma_{UV} \) \( \Sigma_{U/V} = \Sigma_{UU}^{-1} \Sigma_{UV} \Sigma_{VV}^{-1} \Sigma_{VV} \) denotes the covariance matrix of \( V \) and so on.

Setting \( Z = (X,Y) \) and applying the above to (3.1) we have

(A.1) \[ Z \sim N(\mu_0 (1_p, 1_p), \Sigma_{ZZ}) \]

where

\[ \Sigma_{ZZ} = \text{diag}(\sigma^2_X, \sigma^2_Y) \otimes I_p + \sigma^2 J_2 \otimes I_p + \sigma^2 J_2 \otimes 1_p 1_p^T \]

where \( \otimes \) denotes the Kronecker matrix product and \( J_2 \) is the matrix with all 1 entries. Further,

\[ E(\theta | Z) = E(\theta) - E(Z) \cdot \zeta + Z \cdot \zeta \]

where

\[ \zeta = \Sigma_{ZZ}^{-1} \Sigma_{Z\theta} \]
with

\[ \Sigma_{Z\theta} = \begin{pmatrix} I_p \\ I_p \\ I_p \end{pmatrix} \Sigma_{\theta} \]

and

\[ \Sigma_{\theta} = \sigma_1^2 I_p + \sigma_2^2 I_p I_p. \]

We now determine \( \Sigma_{ZZ}^{-1} \). First we note that

\[ I_p^T I_p = P^T \Delta P \]

where \( P \) denotes the Helmert orthogonal matrix (c.f. [2], p. 102) and \( \Delta \) is the \( p \times p \) matrix with 1 in the \((1,1)\) position and all remaining entries zero.

One then notes that

\[ (I_2 \otimes P) \Sigma_{ZZ}^{-1} (I_2 \otimes P^T) \]

reduces to just

\[ \text{diag}(\sigma_X^2, \sigma_Y^2) \otimes I_p + \sigma_J^2 \otimes I_p + \mu_2^2 \otimes \Delta \]

which makes it straightforward to show

\[ \Sigma_{ZZ}^{-1} = (I_2 \otimes P^T) \theta (I_2 \otimes P) \]
where

$$
\theta = \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma_X^{-2} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \sigma_Y^{-2} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \alpha_{I_{p-1}}^T
\end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 \\
0 & \alpha_{I_{p-1}}^T \\
\gamma & 0
\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}
1 & -1 \\
-1 & 1 \\
0 & 0
\end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma_X^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} \\
\sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} \\
\sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} & \sigma_Y^{-2} \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \alpha_{I_{p-1}}^T
\end{pmatrix}
$$

where $\gamma$ and $\alpha$ are as in Theorem 3.1.

From these results an explicit expression for $Z \cdot \zeta$ is readily obtained. We first note

$$
Z \cdot \zeta = (XP^T, YP^T) \otimes (F^T, F^T)^T \Sigma_{\theta \theta}
$$

and

$$
\Theta(F^T, F^T)^T = (\sigma_X^{-2}, \sigma_Y^{-2})^T \otimes \begin{pmatrix}
\gamma & 0 \\
0 & \alpha_{I_{p-1}}^T
\end{pmatrix} P.
$$

Thus

$$
(A.2) \quad Z \cdot \zeta = (XP^T, YP^T) \left(\sigma_X^{-2}, \sigma_Y^{-2}\right)^T \otimes \begin{pmatrix}
\gamma & 0 \\
0 & \alpha_{I_{p-1}}^T
\end{pmatrix} \left(\sigma_{0}^2 I_p + \rho^2 \Delta\right) P = (\sigma_X^{-2} X + \sigma_Y^{-2} Y) A
$$

where

$$
A = P^T \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma_Y^2 & 0 \\
0 & \sigma_Y^2 \alpha_{I_{p-1}}^T
\end{pmatrix} P.
$$

Now represent $X$ as

$$
X = \bar{X} I_p + (X - \bar{X} I_p).
$$

Then we have

$$
XP^T = X(p^{1/2}, 0, \ldots, 0) + (0, X(2))
$$

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where
\[ x(2) = \left( \frac{x_1-x_2}{\sqrt{1.2}}, \frac{x_1+x_2-2x_3}{\sqrt{2.3}}, \ldots, \frac{x_1+x_2+\cdots+x_p-1-(p-1)x_p}{\sqrt{(1-p)p}} \right) \]

so
\[ xA = \sigma^2 \gamma \bar{x}(p^{1/2}, 0, \ldots, 0) + \sigma^2 \alpha(0, x(2))p \]
\[ = \sigma^2 \gamma \bar{x} p + \sigma^2 \alpha(\bar{x} - \bar{y} p) \, . \]

A similar result holds for YA. Introducing the resulting expressions for XA and YA in (A.2) yields

\[ (A.3) \quad (\sigma_X^{-2} x + \sigma_Y^{-2} y) A = (1-\gamma) [(\beta \bar{x} + (1-\beta) \bar{y}) p + (1-\alpha) [\beta (x - \bar{x} p) + (1-\beta) (y - \bar{y} p)] \]

since \( \gamma \sigma^2 (\sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2}) = 1-\gamma \) and \( \alpha \sigma^2 (\sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2}) = 1-\alpha \).

From the expression just obtained in (A.3) \( E(Z) \cdot \zeta \) and hence \( E(\theta) - E(Z) \cdot \zeta \) are easily found. To get \( E(Z) \cdot \zeta \) simply substitute \( \mu_0^p \) for both X and Y. This gives

\[ E(Z) \cdot \zeta = \gamma \sigma^2 [\sigma_X^{-2} + \sigma_Y^{-2}] \mu_0^p \, . \]

At the same time \( E(\theta) = \mu_0^p \), so we have

\[ (A.4) \quad E(\theta) - E(Z) \cdot \zeta = \gamma \mu_0^p \]

The proof of Theorem 3.1 is now an immediate consequence of (A.3) and (A.4).
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References


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OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR SECOND GUESSERS

A model is given for a class of contests in which the participants try to guess (or estimate) unknown quantities, and the objective of each player is to come closer to the unknown quantities than his adversary. A general optimality result is proved which gives the best guessing rules for the second guesser. These rules are first calculated exactly in a certain hierarchical linear model, and then simpler approximate rules are given.